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The takeup of opportunities for applying formal learning outside the school is 
often disappointing - to teachers, parents, employers, and many pupils. Not 
surprisingly, there is much controversy among researchers in mathematics 
education and related fields, as to the reasons. Here I argue that neither 
traditional or constructivist views, with their simplistic faith in the basic continuity 
of knowledge across contexts, nor currently popular 'insulationist' views such as 
the strong form of situated cognition, which claims that transfer is basically not 
possible, are adequate. Instead,  I analyse why transfer is problematical in 
principle, and undependable in practice. I recommend an alternative approach for 
building bridges between practices, based on analysing the discourses involved 
as systems of signs, and looking for appropriate points of inter-relation between 
them. In this reconceptualisation of the 'problem' of transfer, the role of affective 
factors, previously under-examined in the literature, is highlighted. 
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1. Introduction  
 
If schooling is to be relevant to settings and activities outside itself,  then we need 
some account of how learning from the school can be applied in, or 'transferred' to, 
other contexts. The transfer of learning refers in  general to  the  use  of  ideas and 
knowledge learned in one context in another. This might take one of several forms: 
(i) the use of a school subject like mathematics outside of its own domain, say in 
physics or economics; 
(ii) the application of knowledge from pedagogic contexts  to  work  or  everyday 
activities; or  
(iii) the 'harnessing' of out-of-school activities for the learning of school subjects.   
Other forms of 'recontextualisation', e.g. the reformulation of academic discourses as 
school subjects, are related; see below. 
Here I am especially interested in issues around (ii), particularly applications 
in work contexts, and (iii), 'harnessing'. These are clearly crucial issues for schooling, 
 
 2 
higher education, adult education, and for training. And especially so for mathemat-
ics, which is claimed to have wide applicability across the curriculum, and outside the 
school or college.  
 
 
2. Divergence of Views on 'Transfer' 
 
Questions around transfer are strongly contested, and a variety of views proliferate 
in educational circles, as well as in psychology and sociology. The discussion has 
been especially vibrant in mathematics education, where we are currently offered 
several conflicting approaches. In this section I present an overview of the views on 
transfer involved in five approaches: 'traditional' views, constructivism, the 'strong 
form' of situated cognition, structuralist views, and poststructuralism. Below I 
consider the Brazilian research programme (Nunes et al., 1993), and, in sections 3 
and 5, I develop my view based on insights from poststructuralism, which I argue 
offers the most promising basis for a viable position. 
I begin with traditional approaches. These can be seen to include views 
favouring the use of behavioural learning objectives (e.g. Glenn, 1978), 'basic skills' 
approaches, and  'utilitarian' views such as those of the Cockcroft Report (1982). 
They share several important ideas. Teaching and learning are seen as involving the 
transmission and internalisation of a body of knowledge (and skills). A problem or 
'task' (or 'skill'), and the mathematical  thinking involved in addressing (or producing) 
it, are seen as able to be described adequately in abstract terms, with little or no 
reference to the context - e.g. simply as 'proportional reasoning'. Hence it is claimed 
to be possible to talk about 'the same mathematical task' occurring across several 
different contexts. Therefore traditional views expect that the transfer of learning, e.g. 
from school to everyday situations, should be relatively unproblematical - at least, in 
principle, for those who have been properly taught. 
A number of problems with these views can be summarised. It has been 
found difficult to describe a task, in ways that are abstracted from the context, so the 
notion of the 'same mathematical task' in different contexts is highly problematical  
(Walkerdine, 1988, pp. 51ff.; Newman et al., 1989, ch.3). Where there is an attempt 
to describe the context of a problem, traditional views generally consider it to be 
indicated (unproblematically) by its wording, and that context is normally just named 
- as 'school maths', 'consumer maths', etc. Thus, the context is usually described 
'naturally' - rather than being analysed for its socially constructed qualities  (e.g. 
Atweh et al., 1998). 
In addition, the methods of addressing a task have been shown to vary a 
great deal across different contexts - for example, in terms of the methods of 
calculation or types of representation (e.g. oral vs. written) used (Nunes et al., 1993; 
Lave, 1988). And the levels of perfomance of what appears to be 'the same task' 
have varied dramatically across different contexts  (ibid.) 
Not surprisingly, studies focussed on the problem of transfer, from school to 
outside activities, suggest that much teaching has disappointing results in this 
respect (e.g. Boaler, 1998), and students often 'fail' to acomplish it (e.g. Molyneux 
and Sutherland, 1996). One reason may be that people do not 'spontaneously see' 
the transfer (the task, the goal) their teachers (or their managers) have in mind. And, 
even if they see it, they may not be motivated to carry it out (NOTE 1). In such 
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cases, a researcher may conclude that a  'mathematical' signifier is not recognised 
as such,  whereas  it  may  be  recognised, but its mathematical meaning be 
undermined by competing values  related to other discourses, (Dowling, 1991), or by 
affective conflicts (see next section).  
Even where a researcher considers a learner to 'transfer' school algorithms in 
order to address problems from within an everyday practice, the traditional view that 
it is straightforward is contested. Thus Saxe rejects the traditional view of transfer as 
an 'immediate  generalisation or  alignment  of  prior  knowledge  to  a  new  
functional context', and prefers to conceive of it as 'an extended process of  repeated 
 constructions  ... of appropriation and specialisation, as children repeatedly address 
problems that emerge again and again in cultural practices'  (1991, p.235; see also 
Masingila et al., 1996).  
Thus, in recent years, several strong critiques of the traditional view have 
emerged. These can be analysed, using Muller & Taylor's (1995) distinction between 
two tendencies in  curriculum development and change: insulation and hybridity. 
They focus on the idea of boundaries between e.g. school and everyday 
knowledges, or discourses, or cultures. For them, insulation stresses  
 
the impermeable quality of cultural boundaries, of textual classification, of disciplinary 
autonomy.... Hybridity, by contrast, stresses the essential identity and continuity of forms ... of 
knowledge, the permeability of classificatory boundaries, and the promiscuity of cultural 
meanings .... learning to 'cross-over' cultural boundaries is, or should be, the aim of all 
pedagogy. Questions of judgement and of classificatory integrity take second place to the goal 
of individual access to learning. 
(Muller and Taylor, 1995, p.257) 
 
Thus, an hybridiser tends to believe both (i) that boundaries between contexts are low - 
and (ii) that they should be low, lowered, and/or readily crossed. And the two beliefs 
tend to go together, in the thinking of traditionalists: they tend to see tasks in many 
contexts as being essentially mathematical, and to believe that the transfer of learning to 
new contexts should be straightforward. 
And so for constructivists. Muller & Taylor (1995) aim to show the unintended 
consequences of unreflective espousal of 'constructivist' challenges to the traditional 
view on transfer. For them, writing in post-apartheid South Africa, 'constructivism(s)' 
include radical constructivism, social constructivism, and particularly ethnomathematics; 
these have political and pedagogical commitments to challenging a school maths 
dominated by academic mathematics as being a 'sharply located' kind of knowledge - 
Eurocentric, imperialistic, dominated by male values. For Muller and Taylor, the 
constructivists are 'strong hybridisers whose pedagogy assumes a flattening of the 
everyday / school boundary' (pp.267-8). Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, we can see 
that the constructivists share  the hybridising commitment, and the flattening 
assumption, with the traditionalists described above.  
However, if the constructivists are liberal and egalitarian between different forms 
of knowledge, traditionalists are rather imperialist in their desire to privilege mathematics 
as a special kind of (abstract) knowledge, and to apply it widely.  
In contrast, a third position, which might be called the strong form of situated 
cognition, bases its position on  Jean Lave's Cognition in Practice (1988), and argues 
that there is a disjunction between doing maths problems in school, and numerate 
problems in everyday life. This is because these different contexts are characterised by 
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different structuring resources - different ongoing activities, different social relations, 
different cultural forms of quantity (e.g. money), and so on. Further, people's thinking is 
specific to these disjoint practices, and settings. Thus transfer of learning from school or 
academic contexts to outside ones is pretty hopeless. 
In terms of my classificatory framework, the strong form of situated cognition 
could be classed as having an insulating commitment, and a belief in boundaries 
between practices as high  - and, against the traditionalists, as not wanting to  privilege 
mathematics as a special kind of knowledge.  
The strong form of situated cognition is presented here as an ‘ideal type’, but it 
still has many proponents. The work of Jean Lave herself has moved on. Her recent 
studies (Chaiklin and Lave, 1993; Lave, 1996a)  focus on describing learning within 
communities of practice (Lave and Wenger, 1991).  This work is no longer so concerned 
to stress discontinuities between practices: it acknowledges that no practice could ever 
be completely closed, and that a community must be understood in relation to other 
tangential, or overlapping, communities. The approach now consists of identifying 
communities of practice which are interdependent, and studying the bridges between 
them, particularly the social relations and identities across them (Lave, 1996b).  
However, there are a number of problems and gaps in the account given by 
situated cognition. First, in its strong form, the view threatens a cul-de-sac (Noss & 
Hoyles, 1996b, ch.2): there is a proliferation of differently situated types of mathematical 
thinking, with high boundaries between them, and the use of one type of thinking in 
another context is indeed pretty hopeless. Second, in this approach, there seems to be 
an assumption that practices and communities of practice can be seen as 'natural' - 
whereas I argue that analysis of the bases of different practices (and communities) is 
required. Although Lave and some others researching within broadly situated 
approaches (e.g. Greeno et al., 1993) mention 'sign systems', etc., I emphasise the 
systematic consideration of  the effects of language and discourse underlying practices 
in different contexts. 
For an indication of how this concern with language might help clarify the idea of 
boundaries between practices, we can turn to certain structuralist approaches. Muller 
and Taylor draw on Basil Bernstein's (e.g. 1996) sociological discussion of boundaries 
between knowledges, where different knowledges are seen as different discourses or 
systems of language. School knowledge is reinterpreted or transformed from academic 
knowledge in the universities, by  processes of recontextualisation, which produce a 
new discourse with distinctive principles of selection, ordering and focussing. Thus, 
Bernstein  is an insulator, for whom 'curricular knowledge is part of that large class of 
esoteric discourses, separated from everyday knowledge by a hard boundary that we 
weaken at our peril' (Muller and Taylor, pp.262-3).  
Paul Dowling (e.g. 1994) develops these ideas by showing that the mathematical 
texts prescribed for 'lower ability' students and which incorporate numerous examples 
intending to model every day situations, have the consequence of excluding their 
readers from the 'esoteric' discourse of school mathematics proper. For Dowling, the 
recontextualisation of everday life material into the curriculum ends up by being neither 
'real maths' nor 'real life'. Besides distorting the everyday setting - in which the 'lower 
ability' learners are meant to feel 'at home', it also inculcates an anodyne view of 
mathematics as a series of algorithmic solutions - very different from the view of 
mathematics as a connected set of generalisable principles, into which only the 'higher 
ability' students are inducted. This structuralist work points to ways of analysing 
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practices and the boundaries between them, but there is still the threat of arriving at the 
same sort of cul-de-sac as with the strongly situated approach: 'Dowling's strong 
position would seem to imply that school mathematics should incorporate no “real world” 
examples' (Muller & Taylor, p.268). 
Valerie Walkerdine's poststructuralist work is sensitive to the need to avoid the 
pitfalls revealed by Dowling. Like the constructivists, she is committed to bridging the 
space between everyday and school knowledge, but, unlike them, rather than assuming 
it away, she sees the importance of theorising the boundary.  As with situated cognition, 
she recognises different practices as in principle distinct, but sees this distinction as 
requiring analysis, rather than leading to despair about bridging. 
The discussion so far shows that two issues need to be addressed, so as to 
formulate the problem of 'transfer' satisfactorily. They are: 
(1) how to define and delineate the contexts of thinking, activity and learning, and the 
related practices at play in them; and 
(2) how to describe the relations between practices, e.g. what the boundaries or bridges 
between them might be like. 
A third issue is crucial, as I argue below: 
(3) how to acknowledge the importance of affect, motivation and  so on, so as  to avoid 
separating thought, feeling and value. 
The initial locating of Walkerdine's position above suggests that certain 
approaches drawing on discourse theory, and poststructuralist insights, can make a 
contribution to elucidating these issues (e.g. Walkerdine, 1988, 1997; Walkerdine and 
Girls & Maths Unit, 1989; Taylor, 1989; Muller and Taylor, 1995; Dowling, 1995; Evans 
and Tsatsaroni, 1994, 1996; Evans, 1999a).  
 
 
3. Conceptualising Practices, Boundaries and Bridges  
 
3.1 Describing the contexts, and the practices at play  
 
The approach I am advocating focusses on practices: examples would be school 
mathematics, academic (research) mathematics, work practices such as nursing 
(Pozzi et al., 1998) and banking (Noss & Hoyles, 1996a), apprenticeship e.g. into 
tailoring (Lave & Wenger, 1991), and everyday practices such as shopping (Lave, 
1988). Each context is constituted by one or more practices, and by the related 
discourses. Discourses are systems of ideas expressed in terms of signs. These 
discourses give meaning to the practice by expressing the goals and values of the 
practice, and regulate it in a systematic way, by setting down standards of 
performance.  
Important practices are associated with a community of practice, a subculture 
of individuals with (some) shared goals, and a set of social relations (power, 
difference) with  different members of the community taking up different subject-
positions. For example, the basic positions available in school mathematics are 
normally 'teacher' and 'pupil'; in shopping or street-selling, they would be 'seller' and 
'buyer'. In a particular setting, we can analyse the practices at play, that would be 
involved in the positioning of participants (NOTE 2).  
This approach, like situated cognition, recognises different practices as in 
principle distinct, as discontinuous - e.g. school maths and everyday practices like 
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street selling. But, using the approach recommended here, we can go further - to 
analyse the differences. Language and meaning in the discourses involved can be 
analysed by considering relations of signification - relations of similarity and 
difference between terms or signifiers (words, gestures, sounds, etc.) and signifieds, 
and devices such as metaphor and metonymy. For example, a knowledge of 
counting will help with playing cards - but only up to a point: to play bridge or whist 
with the standard deck, you must know the ranking of numbers up to ten - but also 
that the Ace, though signified by a single  heart, etc. will beat all others in that suit. 
So far this draws on de Saussure's structural linguistics. Going further, various 
writers have shown how to use poststructuralist ideas about the inevitable tendency 
of the signifier to slip into other contexts, thereby making links with other discourses, 
and producing a play of multiple meanings - so as to provide insight into meaning-
making in mathematics; see examples below of the different possible meanings of 
'more', and of  'shopping with mummy';  also Walkerdine (1988, Ch.2) on children's 
use of language to indicate relations of size, Brown (1994) and Evans and 
Tsatsaroni (1994). Thus, rather than attempting to specify the context of a school 
maths problem by looking only at its wording - or by naming the context as if simply 
based in 'natural' settings, we can describe it as socially constructed in discourse -  
through  attention to particular signifiers and their relations in texts, such as interview 
transcripts (see 'Donald's' case study below). 
Different practices may  also be characterised in terms of their 'well-known 
results' (cf. Lawler, 1981), and their familiar methods. An example can be given by 
contrasting a street seller's calculation of the cost of 10 coconuts (@ 35cr. each) - as 
105 (three 35's, a 'well-known result'), plus 105, plus 105, plus a final 35 - with a 
pupil's doing 35 x 10 (Nunes et al., 1993, Ch.2). 
 
3.2 Describing the relations between practices, the boundaries or bridges between 
them  
 
To build bridges between practices, one must try to identify areas where out-of-
school practices might usefully 'overlap' or 'inter-relate' with school mathematics. 
This requires first of all that distinctions are made between those relations of 
signification in the learner's everday practices that provide fruitful 'points of 
articulation' with school maths, and those that may be misleading (Muller and Taylor, 
1995), as in the whist example (above). Another example of a misleading inter-
relation would be an attempt to harness young children's everyday understanding of 
'more' to teach the comparison of quantity at school. The problem is that in home 
discourses, the  opposite of 'more' is no more (as in 'no more ice cream for you'), 
but, in school discourses, 'more' forms an oppositional couple with less  (Walkerdine 
and Girls and Maths Unit, 1989, pp.52-53). Here the signifier 'more' signifies 
differently in home and school practices. 
Besides attending to fruitful (non-misleading) points of inter-relation, we must 
structure the pedagogic discourse so as to work systematically through a process of 
translation. This involves 'prising apart' signifiers and signifieds linked in one set of  
signs, and reinserting them a new set of signs.  
This is done through the construction of ‘chains of meaning’. A very simple 
example is that of a mother who uses a discussion with her child on the number of 
drinks needed for a party of the child's friends to teach the child to count by the 
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following transformations from one step to another (Walkerdine, 1988, p.128ff): 
 
Step    
 1 Child (signified)  
Name (signifier)  
 2   Name (signified)      
Finger (iconic signifier)  
 3     Finger (signified) 
Spoken Numeral (symbolic signifier) 
 4       Spoken Numeral (signified)  
Written Numeral (symbolic signifier) 
 
At the first step, the mother-teacher, encourages the child to form a sign linking the 
name of each child (signifier) with the 'idea' of that child (signified). At each subsequent 
step, the signifier from the previous stage becomes the new signified, which is in turn 
linked to a new signifier (gesture, numeral). Here, each different step does not really 
represent a different discourse, but the overall chain nevertheless shows how a series of 
carefully constructed links between signifiers and signifieds could provide the bridges for 
crossing boundaries between discourses - here, the basis for transfer between home 
practices and school maths. (This scheme may suggest the basic form of a strategy for 
'teaching for transfer'.)  
Another example is provided by a primary teacher aiming to harness the 
children's prior knowledge from outside school about counting objects etc., to lead to 
learning about addition in school mathematics (Walkerdine, 1988, Ch.6). Again, she 
shows how the process of 'translation' or 'transformation' of discourses must be 
accomplished through careful attention to the relating of signifiers and signifieds in 
particular chains of meaning. Thus,  
 
... teachers manage in very subtle ways to move the children ... by a process in which the 
metonymic form of the statement remains the same while the relations on the metaphoric axis  are 
successfully transformed, until the children are left with a written metonymic statement ....   
 (Walkerdine, 1982, pp. 153-4) 
 
However, transfer can go wrong if these issues are neglected, as illustrated 
by  a primary school 'shopping game' (Walkerdine, 1988, Ch. 7). There a boy made 
'errors' in his sums because he did not realise that, in the game, one was allowed - 
indeed, one was required by the rules, made to ensure the game's pedagogic 
effectiveness - to start afresh with a new 10p after each purchase. Though the child 
called up - that is, identified the task as - practical shopping, through which he 'made 
sense' of the apparent demands of the task, he nonetheless made errors because he 
was positioned in, and regulated by, the pedagogic shopping game.(NOTE 3) 
  While some aspects of everyday shopping  practice were also useful in the 
game - say, remembering the familiar result that 'when you have 10p and buy 
something worth 9p, you will have 1p left', other aspects of shopping - for example, 
the knowledge of the requirement of giving up money to obtain a purchase - were not 
'included' in the discourse of the school shopping game. Also, importantly, the goals 
and purposes were quite different in the two practices. Thus, Walkerdine (1988, pp. 
115 ff) argues that activity within one discourse - say, playing the card game whist - 
will help with school maths in those, and only those, aspects of the game which are 
both contained in school maths and which enter into similar relations of signification 
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(see also sec. 3.1). 
 
3.3 Acknowledging the importance of affect, and the inter-relationship of thought, 
feeling and value 
 
Most accounts of mathematical thinking, including those mentioned in Sec.2, largely 
ignore affect. There are a few exceptions. Taylor has discussed the power of desire 
at the individual and the societal level (e.g. 1989). Walkerdine has emphasised the 
importance  of  the relations  between  cognition  and  affect: 'meanings are not just 
intellectual' (Walkerdine & Girls and Maths Unit, 1989, p.52). Evans & Tsatsaroni 
(1996) have reviewed several different approaches to linking cognition and affect, 
and have argued for the approach presented here. 
Affect can be seen as the energy behind much activity: 'Emotion powers 
reason' (Buxton, 1981). In this discussion, affect can be understood as an emotional 
charge attached to particular words, gestures, and so on. These signifiers are linked 
together to make up chains of  meaning. Thus  the charge can flow from one signifier 
to another, by displacement.   
An example comes from an episode with an interviewee in my research 
(described below), 'Ellen'. When asked to calculate a 15% tip for a meal she has 
'chosen' from a restaurant menu, she hesitates, then makes a 'slip' (dividing by 15, 
rather than multiplying). In response to a 'context-sensing question' about how often 
she does this sort of calculation, she admits that she doesn't usually pay, but 
nevertheless, she habitually adds up the cost of her meal - since she doesn't 'want to 
be an expense'. It is possible to read 'expense' as a  signifier on which meanings are 
condensed: it would signify for Ellen both the cost of, say, her meal obtained by 
summing the individual dishes, and her being a burden within a relationship: these 
two ideas are metaphorically linked in her history.  In this case the signifier 'expense' 
would be located at the intersection of two (at least) discourses (discourses on 
relationships, on eating out, and on school maths) The anxiety, guilt, pain of being an 
expense could be displaced onto the idea of the cost of her meal, and in turn onto 
any calculations entailed in producing that sum, including that of a tip. Here her 
displaced anxiety may influence her ability to transfer the calculation of 15% from 
school contexts (where she was a successful student) to everyday (eating out) or 
hybrid contexts (Evans and Tsatsaroni, 1994, 1996). 
I would argue that the quality and intensity of affective charges may often be a 
major influence in the success or failure of many attempts at transfer - an influence 
that has so far been largely ignored in the mathematics education literature.  
The inclusion  of affect or emotion in the analysis of a particular subject's 
thinking is not just an 'optional extra'. Other work shows that whenever a teacher 
reaches outside of mathematics for an illustration, the mathematics is 'at risk'; e.g. 
when illustrating addition in the context of shopping with 'Mummy', if the mother 'has 
financial difficulties, ... is sick, far away or deceased' (Adda, 1986, p.59). This is 
because of the fundamental character of language, its ability to produce 'multiple 
meanings': the signifier can always break with any given context, and be inscribed in 
new contexts without limit (Evans and Tsatsaroni, 1994, p.184).  
Thus another reason that a particular set of relations of signification may not 
provide fruitful inter-relations is that these relations may be distressing or distracting - 
and not only misleading.  
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Most of the examples of transfer discussed so far are examples of what is 
sometimes called harnessing, the use of knowledge from out-of-school contexts in 
school. Similar issues can be expected to arise in attempts to transfer from school 
learning to work or outside contexts; see the illustration and the case study below. 
 
 
4. An Illustration: Looking for the Mathematics in Work 
 
Noss & Hoyles (1996a) give a fascinating account of research done as preparation 
for teaching a course in 'banking maths' (BM) to employees of  a major investment 
bank. They aim thereby to bring about changes in the work discourse by challenging 
it with academic maths - and also realise that this will challenge their position in 
academic maths (AM): '... to make sense of the world we were watching, we had to 
find a way to impose a mathematical gaze on it' (p.9).  
In their general discussion of context, Noss and Hoyles emphasise 
mathematical representations (as do Nunes et al. - see below). They also 
problematise the characterisation of mathematics as involving straightforward 
decontextualisation and abstraction - thereby questioning further most traditional and 
constructivist positions - and focus on processes of ‘situated abstraction’ (1996b). 
 We can consider key points of their work in a way parallelling the discussion in 
the previous section: 
(i) a recognition that work practices and school maths discourses are distinct: Noss 
and Hoyles found that the inhabitants of the bank 'spoke a different 
language....'(1996a, p.7). Further, in banking maths, standards of accuracy are 
distinctive (e.g. the tolerance of $25 allowed on large-scale transfers); certain well-
known results can be used to avoid the need for calculations (e.g the fact that a 
Treasury Bill will have a lower purchase price than a simple interest 'instrument' at 
same rate of simple interest / discounting). Further, familiar representations, such as 
graphs, are 'read' differently: in BM, graphs tend to be considered as displays of data 
- whereas, in academic maths (AM), they are read as a 'medium for expressing 
relationships'  (pp.13-15).  
(ii) locating relations of signification that provide fruitful points of inter-relation in the 
learner's everday practices:  One example is the care that is required in discussing 
interest calculations (using percentages), where the conceptual priority (in AM terms) 
of simple interest (prior to compound interest) conflicts with its relative rarity in BM 
practice (pp.12-13). 
(iii) identifying areas where work practices might usefully overlap with academic 
mathematics, and structuring the academic discourse so as to work systematically 
through the process of transfer: Noss and Hoyles used the idea of a function as a 
'bridging concept' between BM and AM, and used programming as a way of building 
models, so that their students would learn  
 
what it means to construct a mathematical relationship, and how and why the language of 
mathematics assists in conferring expressive power to the description of relationships.... 
programming is a way by which learners can express the state of their current understandings 
symbolically while holding on to the meanings which can all-too-easily become lost in the 
passage to conventional mathematical discourse. 




Importantly, Noss and Hoyles also show how to develop new ideas on building bridges, 
by: 
(iv) developing a deeper mathematisation, by posing 'provocative' problems that appear 
'innocent' in BM, but are deeply significant in AM: For example, they use their 
knowledge of the meanings within the practical context (BM) to seize on the idea of 
'continuous compounding', where the periods over which interest is calculated 
continually shrink (from yearly to monthly, to daily, etc.) and which is normally 
considered only as an 'exotic' topic in financial maths texts (1996a, p.20). 
Thus Noss and Hoyles's work shows us how to apply and to enrich our 
developing notions of focussing on similarities and differences. They show how to 
enhance curriculum development with research, and to carefully construct the 
pedagogic discourse, so as to facilitate 'transfer'. Interestingly, this project combines 
harnessing knowledge from the practical context (for teaching purposes) with applying 
knowledge from the teaching situation to work practices. 
 
 
5. A Closer Look at the Context 
 
Nunes, Schliemann and Carraher (1993) have made great contributions to the study of 
context and of transfer. They have studied a wide range of occupations in their work 
settings - street-sellers, carpenters, farmers, fishermen, and so on - and pupils in the 
school setting. They have teased out several different levels of transfer, such as:  
• application to problems with unfamiliar parameters, e.g. to non-standard ratios or 
scales on drawings for buildings (1993, Ch.5); 
• reversibility or use of a procedure in the opposite direction from its usual use, e.g 
calculating a unit price, given the cost of n items; or  
• transfer across situation(s), e.g asking fishermen to solve unfamiliar ratio 
problems concerning the relationship between unprocessed and processed 
seafood that were isomorphic, in Nunes et al.'s view, to familiar problems about 
weight-price relationships (1993, pp.108ff.)  
 
Nunes et al. have a range of theoretical antecedents (1993, Ch.7) including Gerard 
Vergnaud's (e.g. 1988) theory of concepts, in which structure ('invariants'), context 
('situations'), and representation (especially oral vs. written modes) all play a role (see 
also Noss & Hoyles, 1996b, Ch.2). Their methodology has generally included both 
ethnographic description of the work practices of the relevant community, particularly 
the numerate aspects,  and 'transfer experiments'. Here the subject is asked to solve 
problems that are familiar from their work, then to attempt others with requirements 
differing, for example, on one or more of the 'levels' of transfer indicated above. In  one 
set of experiments Nunes et al. found that fishermen were able to use their everyday 
mathematics thinking in a conceptual, rather than just a procedural, way, to solve a 
range of problems, demonstrating (ii) reversibility and (iii) transfer (1993, pp.108-116). 
Similarly, Schliemann and Carraher (1992) conclude that  
 
learners can develop proportional reasoning first in a limited range of contexts. ... Given the 
proper conditions, similarities of relations can be detected and transfer and generalisation become 
possible. This recognition may then act as a bridge for transfer of procedures to the unknown 
contexts. 




Schliemann (1995) concludes more generally 
 
... mathematical knowledge developed in everyday contexts is flexible and general. Strategies 
developed to solve problems in a specific context can be applied to other contexts, provided that 
the relations between the quantities in the target context are known by the subject as being 
related in the same manner as the quantities in the initial context are. (p.49, my emphasis) 
 
This is a similar conclusion to that reached by Walkerdine, on using experience with 
games like whist to help with learning maths (see above). But the argument in this paper 
points to analysing both similarities and differences. 
In much of their reporting,  Nunes et al. (e.g. 1993) have dealt with the complexity 
of the context of problem-solving by isolating out the 'situation' within which they assume 
the subject is thinking. Here the situation is understood as that part of the context that 
provides the overt background to problems - e.g as  computation exercises, word 
problems or a 'store simulation'; the context additionally includes the setting and social 
relations - e.g. a clinical interview, or written test. The authors argue (e.g. 1993, Ch.3) 
that, while they are varying the situation across different problems, the context is held 
constant.  
This separation of  'context' and 'situation' is an ingenious attempt to bring the 
crucial bases for thinking under the researcher's control: the experimenter allocates the 
situation for a given task in a controlled way, while the context of setting and social 
relations is assumed to be held constant over different situations.  But this diminishes 
the importance of the context since the latter  is kept away from the forefront of the 
analysis, and since its multiple facets (language, goals, social relations - see sec. 3.1) 
cannot be captured by the situation.  The situation is considered to be given by the 
wording of the problem, and by any background information given by the interviewer, or 
taken-as-given by all subjects. Thus focussing on the situation in this way, at the 
expense of the context  (at least in the transfer  experiments) runs the risk of taking us 
back to traditional approaches (see Sec. 2). 
Moreover, the context is not simply 'given' - the subject is involved in 
'constructing', or construing,  it! There may thus be significant variation in subjects' 
experience of the context. In particular, schooled subjects may call up school discourses 
as the basis for the context for their problem-solving. Nunes et al. acknowledge this 
possibility by recording the number of years of schooling for their subjects, and by 
comparing school students' and working-people's performances in some of their 
designs. But this may not adequately capture the likely variation across subjects in 
construing and experiencing the context. And this variation is not under the control of 
the researcher. 
I aimed to take account of these problems in my research (Evans & Tsatsaroni, 
1994; Evans, 2000), with college students, many of them over 21 years old, returning to 
study after some years of work or child-care. A set of semi-structured interviews 
focussed on maths “life-histories”, and on responses to several problems - e.g. reading 
graphs, deciding how much (if at all) they would tip after a restaurant meal, deciding 
which bottle of sauce would be the 'best buy' (cf. Sewell, 1981). These problems were 
chosen so that the context might be viewed either as mathematical, or as based on out-
of-school practice(s).  
I  allowed that the context of activity may be different for different subjects in the 
same setting, by distinguishing the practice(s) at play in the setting  from the practice(s) 
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called up by different subjects.  The practice(s) at play in the setting are considered to 
be the same for all subjects, whereas the practice(s) called up by different subjects may 
differ - even when they confront what appears to be 'the same task'.  
It is the inter-relationship between the practice(s) at play and the practice(s) 
called up, a positioning based in language / discourse, that forms the context of a task 
for a particular subject. My analysis of my interview setting was that the  two practices 
generally at play in the setting were: college maths, with subject-positions lecturer and 
student; and research interviewing, with subject-positions interviewer and respondent. 
Further, I considered that a particular student , in response to a particular interview 
question, might call up one of these two practices, or another practice e.g business 
discourses or eating out - or indeed, a combination of two or more practices. For further 
details, see Evans and Tsatsaroni (1994, 1996). 
For this analysis, I needed to see whether sufficent information could be elicited 
from the interview to judge the context of students' thinking and affective responses to 
each of a range of problems. Here the use of contexting (or context-sensing) questions 
was a crucial innovation. When the student was first shown the 'props' for the problem - 
e.g. a facsimile of a graph from a newspaper in Question 3 (see Figure 1) - before being 
asked anything 'mathematical' - s/he was asked: 'Does this remind you of anything you 
currently do?'. And after discussing the question, s/he was asked 'Does this remind you 
of any earlier experiences?'. Subjects' responses to these questions helped me judge 
the context of their thinking about the problem, in the interview setting.  
 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
To illustrate the method and some findings supportive of the argument here, I 
include an episode from one of the interviews. 'Donald' (a pseudonym) was male, in his 
40s, with an O-level (age 16 qualification) equivalent in Maths. The background of his 
parents was working class; his own was  middle class,  having  worked  on  the money 
markets in London.  
In response to a graph showing how the price of gold varied over one day's 
trading (Figure 1), he begins by calling up business practices, or what might be called 
'financial maths':  
 
JE : Does that remind you of anything that you do these days, or you've done recently?  
S  :  Er, some of the work we done in Phase One [the first semester of the College course], but if  
you ask me straight out of my head, what it reminds me of - I worked once with a credit company 
and  we had charts on the wall, trying to galvanise each of us to do better than the other .... 
....[8 lines omitted]  ...  
That's what that reminds me of - a bad feeling in a way - I felt that a human  being was being 
judged by that bit of paper   (transcript, pp. 8-9)   
    
Here we notice that Donald is reminded both of his 'College maths', and of his earlier 
managing of a  sales team - but it is the latter business practices to which he gives 
priority in calling up. Note that calling up the business practices brings ('bad') feelings 
with it. 
Next in the same episode, he mentions college maths, then seems to link 
'financial maths' with it. 
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JE : ... Does it remind you of Phase One?  
S  :  Yeah,  well,  we done some of the questions like this, and er, the run over the rise and that  
kind of thing...[5 sec.] ...trends, I suppose if you were judging a trend ...   [2  lines omitted]  ...  I  
find  good,  I  like  the fact I can do a chart now .... 
(transcript, pp. 10-11)     
 
Here  he  uses the language of College maths, describing the gradient in terms of 'run' 
and 'rise'. He then  shifts into work discourses, as evidenced by his use of the terms 
'trend' (rather than  'gradient')  and  'chart' (rather than  'graph'),  which were not used in 
the college teaching.  
 
Next I ask specific questions about the  graph.    
 
JE : Right, okay, may I ask you which part of the graph shows where the price was rising fastest?  
S: If I was to make an instant decision, I'd say that one [i.e. before midday] - but obviously want to 
make it on a  count of the line, wouldn't I?  
JE: You'd?...  
S: I'd count a line - as it goes up ...  [25  sec.]  ...  eleven  over  six [for the increase before midday 
- see graph] and ten over six [for the increase before the close], so that one's right - in the first one 
...   
JE: ... [ 2 lines]  And um, what was the lowest price that day? 
S : This one here - five hundred and eighty ... went higher at the close, for some reason...  
 (transcript, p.12) 
 
This reading shows several things relevant to my analysis above: 
• Donald appears able and willing to use both college maths and financial maths; 
further he seems able to choose which practice to use to address the problem 
posed, to decide whether to apply his (more precise) college maths methods of 
calculating gradients to decide when the relevant price was rising faster.  
• He is also aware  of the different goals of the two practices, relating to different 
objectives in using the graph. In business, the objectives are implicitly 
competitive, to compare persons or groups - and growth-orientated, to make 
comparisons over time; in college maths, the aim is to analyse the qualities of the 
curve, including the rate of change. He is aware of different values and standards 
of regulation, in particular of precision, required in the two discourses. 
• He is also open about the different feelings evoked by the two practices. For 
example, his awareness of the different goals of the two practices is sometimes 
painful. 
• Donald is apparently able to focus on discursive similarities and differences: he 
seems able to read the diagram as a 'chart' (business maths) or as a 'graph' 
(college maths), and to recognise the connections between a 'trend' and a 
'gradient' (respectively). Though not certain, it appears that Donald is able to 
bridge the two practices, i.e. to transfer his  college maths methods to help solve 
a problem involving charts - perhaps depending on some notion of economy of 
cognitive effort (cf. Pea, 1987). 
• In this analysis, attention is drawn to the diagram, and to the role it might play in 
either discourse. Here it seems to provide a crucial representation, allowing one 
to focus on the similarities and difference between the discourses. 
 
Thus,  Noss and Hoyles's  bankers,  and  Donald as a mature student, were able 
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to appreciate the bridging between their learning in college (or academic) maths,  and 
working practices, precisely because they were already familiar with the working 
practice towards which transfer was aimed. It is of course much easier to teach for 
applications, or to learn to undertake them, if one is clear about the contexts from which 
one is departing, and clear about those which one aims to reach. 
 
 
6. Conclusion and Directions for Research 
 
In this paper I take a sceptical, yet optimistic, position on the transfer of mathematical 
learning, as normally understood. 
Continuity between practices (e.g. school and out-of-school activities) is not as 
straightforward as traditional views assume - and hence scepticism is in order about the 
claim that transfer is in principle straightforward. Responding to arguments from situated 
cognition and others, we can agree that there is a distinction - but not a total disjunction 
- between doing maths problems in school, and numerate problems in everyday life, and 
can acknowledge that transfer is not dependable. But it is not impossible; hence we can 
be more optimistic than these latter approaches suggest.   
Although people do seem to transfer ideas, feelings, etc. from one context to 
another under all kinds of conditions - what they transfer is not always what we as 
educators would like them to transfer. Because of the vagaries of signification and also 
of emotional charges, anything like transfer will be difficult to predict or control - even 
with what seems the 'right' pedagogic or social support. The ability of a signifier to form 
different signs, to take different meanings, within different practices, constitutes a severe 
limitation on the possibilities of transfer. 
Yet it also provides the basis for any such possibilities. Though the successful 
building of bridges cannot be guaranteed 'risk-free',  this paper has sketched some 
steps it is necessary to follow. For anything like transfer to occur, a 'translation', a 
making of meaning, across discourses would have to be accomplished through careful 
attention to the relating of signifiers and signifieds, representations and other linguistic 
devices that are used in each discourse, so as to find those crucial ones  that function 
differently - as well as those that function in the same way - in each. This translation is 
not straightforward, but it often will be possible. 
Thus, bridges between practices can be built, by (a) describing the practices 
involved (in the transfer relationship), and  analysing the related discourses, as systems 
of signs; and by (b) analysing the similarities and differences between discourses (e.g. 
school vs. everyday maths), so as to identify  fruitful 'points of inter-relation' between 
school maths and outside ('target') activities. 
In particular, unlike much previous work, the approach developed here 
emphasises the importance of affect, and inter-relationships of thought and feeling. The 
connections and the discontinuities between practices involve not only ideas, strategies, 
etc., but also values and feelings, carried by chains of signification. The cognitive and 
affective aspects of activity are formed and inter-related through the medium of 
language (NOTE 4). 
Ways of designing pedagogic practices can be developed that will facilitate 
transfer, including: task analyses based on (b) above; incorporating a balance of 
generality and situational features in teaching the initial task; and providing practice on a 
range of initial and target tasks (NOTE 5). 
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To advance the study of transfer as reconceptualised, we need research 
programmes including a focus on sign systems and further studies of the workplace (cf. 
Nunes et al., 1993; Noss and Hoyles, 1996b) and of everyday activities (cf. Lave, 1988). 
My work contributes by showing how smaller-scale studies can also produce rich 
material spanning a wide range of practices. In particular, the contexting questions I 
used show how to reveal a wealth of associations between 'mathematical' problems and 
the subject's memories and constructions of experiences  which provide a context for 
speaking of the meanings these problems have for him /her. 
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1. Several of subjects in my interviews (see below) illustrate how failure to recognise this can hinder 
understanding of  cognition. For example, for a 'best buy' question in the interview, a middle-class young 
man, calls  up  shopping  practices - in which for him great value is not placed on saving a few pence, or 
indeed on saving money at all - and school maths is not  called  up.  
2. It should be noted that a practice may be constituted by different discourses; for example, school 
mathematics may be constituted by transmission learning, or by problem-solving / investigative 
approaches. These different discourses will make available different versions of the teacher and the pupil 
positions. This point cannot be developed here, but, on different discourses of gender relations and 
corresponding subject-positions, see Hollway (1989). 
3. Walkerdine does not suggest that the teacher's purpose in playing the shopping game was to produce 
transferable skills (from school to shopping), nor to 'harness' the children's (limited) experience with 
shopping for pedagogic purposes. But it was to give the children  experience of action on money, or 
tokens, which could later be 'dis-embedded' in the process of producing abstract mathematical knowledge. 
4. Fuller consideration of the examples here shows how psychoanalysis can allow insights into the 
affective (Walkerdine, 1988; Evans and Tsatsaroni, 1994, 1996; Evans, 1999a). 
5. Methods of 'teaching for transfer cannot be further discussed here, but see Anderson et al. (1996), 
Masingila et al. (1996), and Evans (1999). 
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Figure 1. Question 3 in the interview 
 
[3]   
This graph shows how the price of gold (in dollars per 
fine ounce) varied during one day’s trading in London. 
Which part of the graph shows where the price was rising 
fastest? What was the lowest price that day? 
 
 




This graph shows how the price 
of gold (in dollars per fine 
ounce) varied during one day’s 
trading in London. 
 
Source: Evans (2000), based 
on Sewell (1981) 
